Patrick J. Noonan has been fighting zealously for his clients since the day he began practicing law. He’s represented clients on a wide variety of cases, such as violent crimes, sex crimes, drug crimes, firearms crimes, theft crimes, property crimes, and operating under the influence. Patrick has earned hundreds of dismissals, negotiated favorable plea agreements, won cases on legal arguments, suppressed incriminating evidence, permanently sealed criminal records, saved his clients from serious jail time, and he’s tried and won Not Guilty verdicts on cases ranging from misdemeanors to serious felonies.
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Public Urination Laws in Massachusetts and Why They Need to be Changed
“Time to get a public urination statute on the books,” an article written by Massachusetts attorney, Patrick Noonan, was recently published by Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly (Vol. 45, Issue No.: 44, October 31, 2016). The article discusses the way in which Massachusetts punishes the act of public urination under its Indecent Exposure statute, why this is a problem, and how Massachusetts should punish the act of public urination.
Let’s say you’re in the middle of a four-hour round of golf. There are no public restrooms, so you go behind a tree to relieve yourself. Another golfer looking for a ball he sliced into the woods happens to see you peeing. Or let’s say you’re on a road trip traveling on the highway when Mother …
Editor of “Detention Status Review Process in Transnational Armed Conflict: Al Maqaleh v. Gates and the Parwan Detention Facility,” an article written by U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Jody M. Prescott and published in the UMass-Law Review Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law (5 U. Mass. Roundtable Symp. L. J. (2010)
You do have the right to remain silent
Author of “You do have the right to remain silent,” published in the Lawyers Journal (Vol. 20, No.: 10, June 2013), which examines a detainee’s right to remain silent during police interrogation in Massachusetts. || Read Full Article
…”About 2 hours and 45 minutes into the interrogation, Helgert asked Thompkins three questions, which elicited three affirmative responses. First, Helgert asked Thompkins whether he believed in God (“yes”). Second, Helgert asked Thompkins whether he prayed to God (“yes”). The final question elicited a fatal affirmative answer and solidified Thompkins’ conviction for first-degree murder:
Helgert asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?” Thompkins answered “Yes.”
Thompkins claimed that he “invoked his privilege” to remain silent by not saying anything. That is, he invoked his right to remain silent by “largely” remaining silent for almost two-hours and forty-five minutes. Put simply, he invoked his right to remain silent by remaining silent.”
Nobody’s Perfect: the need for new expungement law
Author of “Nobody’s Perfect: the need for new expungement law,” published in the Lawyers Journal (Vol. 22, No.: 10, June 2015), which examines the difference between sealing a criminal record and expunging a criminal record in Massachusetts. || Read Full Article
“In Massachusetts, the second you are arrested, the damage is done. The criminal charge will follow you forever. Nobody is perfect. We all make mistakes. Don’t we deserve a second chance? Expungement gives people a second chance. It wipes the record clean. It gives them a “clean slate.”
In Massachusetts, the court has the power to order expungement. However, the court almost never orders expungement, even in cases that cry out for it. The reason why expungement is practically unattainable in Massachusetts is because we have record-sealing statutes instead. A sealed record is nothing like an expunged record. A sealed record provides some protection, but does not give the person the “clean slate” they want and need. On top of that, getting your record sealed in Massachusetts is no easy task. Courts will always deny expungement whenever a defendant has some remedy under the record-sealing statutes. So why do we even have an expungement statute?”
Death of Miranda v. Arizona
Author of “Death of Miranda v. Arizona” published by Bepress Scholarly Publishing (January 2010), examining the impact of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins, which peels back Miranda protections in police interrogations. “Death of Miranda” was cited in an article published in the Seton Hall Law Circuit Review (Vol. 7, Issue 2, Spring 2011)
Removing the Cloak of Immunity
Author of “Removing the Cloak of Immunity” published by Bepress Scholarly Publishing (January 2010), which examines whether a physician should be criminally charged and prosecuted for medical malpractice.
On September 13, 2007, Laura Hope Smith entered the Women’s Health Center in Hyannis, Massachusetts to undergo an abortion procedure. Performing the procedure was Dr. Rapin Osathanondh, a licensed obstetrician of over twenty years. After the procedure was completed and the anesthesia wore off, Smith had not regained consciousness. She had died on the operating table.
Ordinarily, such alleged negligence by a medical professional would be an action in tort for medical malpractice. The defendant-doctor’s negligence, no matter how gross, was rarely the basis for a criminal action. In this sense, doctors enjoyed a “cloak of immunity” from criminal prosecution. In the present case, however, the Cape & Islands District Attorney launched an investigation into the events of September 13, 2007. Through the Commonwealth’s efforts and investigative findings, a Cape Cod grand jury indicted Dr. Osathanondh on a charge of Involuntary Manslaughter.
This paper discusses the unique question of whether a physician should be held criminally responsible for his/her medical negligence, and will use the case of Commonwealth v. Dr. Rapin Osathanondh as the backdrop. In order for the Commonwealth to procure a criminal conviction, it needs to establish three elements beyond a reasonable doubt. This paper will discuss each of those elements, which are: (1) Whether Dr. Rapin Osathanondth’s conduct was the “cause” of Laura Hope Smith’s Death, (2) Whether Dr. Rapin Osathanondth exercised the appropriate standard of care that an ordinary prudent obstetrician would exercise in the same or similar circumstances, (3) Whether Dr. Osathanondh possessed a guilty mind or “Gave a Damn”, and (4) Whether the Commonwealth has enough in their arsenal to establish, causation, standard of care, and mens rea, and hence procure a criminal conviction.
As each element is examined, comparisons will be drawn from varying jurisdictions having dealt with these issues of causation, standard or care, and mens rea in cases of criminal liability for medical malpractice.